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1 Introduction
This second report for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) on
the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan will focus particularly on two issues
that influences provision of humanitarian assistance. We will firstly review the
administrative system in the areas controlled by the Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan (IEA), the governance structure of the Taliban. We will secondly
discuss the issue of Gender, particularly as it relates to the provision of
humanitarian assistance. As a starting point, however, the report will give an
overview over the present humanitarian situation.
The information in the report is based on review of available documents and
report, but builds to a larger extent on field research conducted in different
parts of Afghanistan over the last years. The latest round of research was
undertaken in Western Afghanistan during May 2001. This material includes
a range of interviews with officials from the IEA, United Nations (UN),
employees of national and international non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) and a large number of Afghan women and men.
The Chr. Michelsens Institute (CMI) wishes to thank all those who took time
to respond to our enquiries and provided us with invaluable information. We
would, however, point out that the researchers are solely responsible for the
views expressed in the report, which should not be seen as a representation of
the policy of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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2 Abstract
The humanitarian situation is rapidly deteriorating in Afghanistan, as tension
is increasing between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), or the Taliban,
and the international community. The political implications of non-
recognition and one sided sanctions against the IEA, in short: isolation, has
strengthened the influence of radical and anti-western elements within the
movement. To the Taliban, it seems highly unjustified that the Northern
Alliance is still internationally recognised as Afghanistan’s government, and
changes seem to be achievable only through military means. This escalation of
political tension takes place at a time when a rapidly increasing number of
Afghans leave their homes, now reaching 700 000. A majority migrates due to
the drought, intensified by the accumulated effect of underdevelopment and
compounded by two decades of war. However, the “fighting season” may
cause displacement for several hundred thousand Afghans more. These have to
find shelter within Afghanistan as neighbouring countries have closed their
borders.
The IEA, unlike their adversaries, have taken steps to establish a functional
state administration ranging from the village to the administrative capital of
Kabul and to Kandahar, the functioning religious and political capital. Here
one should bear in mind that the Taliban leaders see themselves as
representatives of the common rural population, intent on controlling the
educated elite that has dominated administration and politics. In their view,
this elite has exploited the population and carries the major responsibility for
two decades of armed conflict. Their expressed intention is to re-establish, but
also adapt, the pre-war administrative structures. Here comes introduction of
a controlling ministry for Vice and Virtue, as well as the establishment of
religious and administrative shuras (councils) at different administrative levels.
The IEA also grants recognition to village shuras, including the development
shuras established by aid agencies. Moreover, the IEA has revitalised the
middleman function of the arbab/malik at the village level. This constitutes an
opportunity for the common Afghan, as well as for humanitarian agencies, to
influence Taliban policies and priorities.
Gender issues is a major “bone of contention” in the relationship between the
IEA and the international community, as gender reforms historically have been
highly contested in Afghanistan. Gender segregation - purdah - and the
demand for women to be accompanied by a male relative- maharam - are
important elements in Taliban's enforcement of the religious law - sharia.
Despite these restrictions, a number of NGOs have managed to establish
innovative projects where different maharam arrangements are utilised to
enhance women’s influence. Long-term refugee experience, particularly in
Iran, has caused wide-ranging changes in the perception of relationship
between the sexes, and hence, represents an untapped resource for more
gender sensitive programming.  Thus a more careful analysis of gender
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relationship, and changes caused by migration, could warrant a more
constructive engagement with the Taliban in the field and overcoming some
very real obstacles to provision of humanitarian assistance.
Humanitarian problems, however, can only be properly addressed if the
political tension between the IEA and the international community is reduced.
Dialogue need to be re-established to ensure that both parties let humanitarian
concerns override military and political considerations. Otherwise, it will be
the common Afghan that stands to loose.
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3 Brief update on the humanitarian situation
Before entering into the selected themes it seems pertinent to provide a brief
update on the worsening humanitarian situation in Afghanistan. There are
two main aspects of the present situation that are particularly important in
relation to the provision of humanitarian assistance: firstly, the tension
between the IEA and the international community; secondly, the drought and
its effects.
Over the past few months, there has been an intensification of the tension
between the IEA and the international community. This relates partly to the
new sanctions regime, which included a one sided arms embargo, as well as a
ban on Taliban representations abroad and on travel for higher officials of the
regime. The international consensus on isolating the Taliban leads to a further
radicalisation of the regime, strengthening the influence of more radical and
anti-western elements within the IEA. The movement has become less willing
to seek compromises with the international community in general, and with
the assistance community in particular. Furthermore, as is common, tension
increases as the parties prepare for the fighting season.
Secondly, the continued and intensifying drought has changed the profile of
people in need of assistance in Afghanistan. Whereas the bulk of humanitarian
assistance has conventionally targeted Afghans fleeing from armed conflict, it
is now the case that the majority of those in need of immediate assistance have
left their homes due to the inability of sustaining their lives. The immediate
cause of this is the drought, but at the same time, this is the accumulated effect
of underdevelopment, compounded by two decades of war. The bulk of the
international assistance is channelled into short-term relief programs. This is
partly as a result of the dramatic humanitarian situation, but it also reflects a
general unwillingness on the behalf of international donor nations, to do
anything that may be seen as providing legitimacy to the regime. Meanwhile,
we can only expect a further deterioration of the local ability to cope.
3.1. IEA and the international community
During the first months of 2001 the relationship between the IEA and the
international community has only become more difficult. The destruction of
non-Islamic artefacts and statues by the IEA, and particularly the blowing up
to the two ancient Buddha statues in Bamiyan, awoke global condemnation.
The recent decision to identify Hindus living in Afghans by marking their
clothes and homes has generated similar international reactions. The United
Nations has also expressed concern over restrictions on access to the
Hazarajat, as well as over detention and harassment of the staff of
humanitarian agencies.
The IEA, on the other hand, brings attention to the UN sanctions, which they
partly blame for the worsened situation in the country. Regime officials are
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not alone in condemning the sanction. The common Afghan is squarely
putting the blame for their increased difficulties on the world community.
Through international radio broadcasts, including BBC Dari and Pashtu news,
most Afghans are informed about the Security Councils justifications for the
sanctions. Still they find them unfair and see it as a punishment of the entire
nation, not only of the Taliban. The sincerity of the international community
is questioned, and indirectly this leads to increased sympathy and support for
the Taliban.
The sanction has particularly focused on three issues: drugs; human rights
(particularly gender); and support to international terrorism (particularly Bin
Laden). On the first two of these issues, the IEA rightly argues that it has been
accommodative. A ban on poppy cultivation has been in place since last
autumn, and it has been effectively sanctioned at great cost to the regime.
Education for girls is now officially accepted in Kandahar and medical
education for women is re-established in the major cities. Hence, there has
been total success on the drug issue, and at least partial progress on the issue
of women’s rights. Yet, the international community has not acknowledged
this progress by adjusting the sanctions regime, or by solidifying the progress
through providing targeted aid. From the Taliban perspective, their
accommodation of international demands leads nowhere.
One of the most serious effects of this international isolation is that moderate
elements within the IEA are loosing influence. Those who argue that an
adjustment of IEA practices would lead to a more accommodating
international community are loosing credibility. In the discussion about the
impact of sanctions, the focus has often been on the humanitarian impact,
whereas there has been fewer debates about how sanctions may cause change
in the internal composition of regimes. In the Afghan case, the sanctions are
not only symbolising stalemate in relations between IEA and the international
community, they also include restrictions on travel and on offices abroad that
directly undermines the possibility to lead a constructive dialogue with the
international community. The consequence is that moderates with the Taliban
loose out, while the more conservative elements within the Taliban are being
radicalised, and increasingly find their only international allies in radical
Islamic networks.
Nonetheless, international recognition remains a priority. From the IEA
perspective, there exists no justification for the continued insistence by the UN
and the international community that the Northern Alliance is still
Afghanistan’s legitimate government. For them, the current sanction is just a
continuation of a long history where the Taliban’s achievements have not been
internationally acknowledged. As a minimum, one would have expected that
the UN has left the Afghanistan seat open. As things stand, they see no other
way to achieve international recognition than through the military defeat of
the Northern Alliance. The Taliban hope that when they control whole of
Afghanistan, international recognition is inevitable. The IEA is, literally,
fighting for recognition.
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At the same time, there is need to be aware that every year, the debate
between the IEA and the international community tends to get more heated
during spring and early summer. This has also been the period of the year
when the Ministry of Vice and Virtue have been most active issuing decrees.
Field staff of UN agencies and NGOs acknowledge that the climate gets more
tense, and that negotiations are more difficult during this period, and express
concern that settlements otherwise acceptable to both sides would be turned
down. As one observer has succinctly described the dilemma of the Taliban:
“This leadership cannot possibly combine its desire to keep its troops prepared
to die for Islamic values and at the same time demonstrate liberal flexibility.”1
The issue of female employment in aid agencies remains a bone of contention
between aid agencies and the IEA. The regime has issued a decree against
employment of Afghan female staff in aid agencies, with the exception of the
health sector. In a recent controversy with IEA, the World Food Programme
(WFP) has threatened to close their bakeries in Kabul, unless they are allowed
to employ female staff to review their list of beneficiaries, which is now five
years old. IEA, on its side, has suggested that the WFP might employ women
from neighbouring countries to undertake the survey, though the UN has
turned this down as unfeasible. Hence, there is an inherent contradiction
between the rights-based approach applied by the UN in Afghanistan, and the
intention to execute so-called needs-based programming. Accordingly, it is
difficult for the common Afghan to comprehend the UN argument: Why
should they wish to close down bakeries providing bread for several hundred
thousands of what everyone agrees is the most destitute part of the
population? And why is it so important to employ Afghan women to
undertake such a survey, if it could be done by other women speaking their
language?
Overall, a major effect of the intensifying isolation of the regime is its
radicalisation. International sanctions have no popular support in
Afghanistan, if anything there is sympathy with the IEA stand on sanctions.
Recent controversies over the provision of aid can only solidify such trends.
There is every reason to be concerned the current deterioration of relations
between the IEA and the aid community can culminate in a new set of political
obstacles to the implementation of humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan.
3.2. People in need of assistance
We continue to see an increase in drought related displacement. The World
Food Programme (WFP) reports that more than 700,000 Afghans have now
been displaced from their place of origin. About 500,000 displaced have
moved to urban centres within Afghanistan. Herat in north-west Afghanistan
is host to a majority of those newly displaced due to drought, with six camps
now housing some 140,000 displaced people, and an ongoing influx from the
neighbouring provinces.2
                                           
1 Gohari. M.J. (2000), The Taliban Ascent to Power, Karachi, Oxford University Press (p.110)
2 WFP (2001), Emergency Report No. 21, 25 May 2001, Islamabad, WFP
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The winter season has not brought the necessary rain and snowfall to mitigate
the effects of three dry years.  As food supplies and resources are exhausted,
and this years harvest is failing, people have little choice but leaving their
homes. In the words of the WFP Country Director “(…) almost half of
Afghanistan's 21 million people have been hit by the current drought and
nearly three million of them are now dependent on food aid for survival. The
grim prospects for the harvest this year could lead to a worse humanitarian
situation than last year (…)"3
The entire country suffers from more than two decades of war and continued
warfare. However, the ongoing military activities are, actually, a lesser cause
for migration than general underdevelopment turning unbearable when
drought is added. If we take a look at internally displaced persons (IDPs)
residing in camps a large majority of these are from areas where large-scale
war activities have been absent for several years.4
Illustration 1: Map indicating end of major military engagement in different
regions of Afghanistan and present war activities.5
                                           
3 WFP Press release: Grim prospects for harvest in Afghanistan, 25 April 2001
4 See UNCO Drought and Displacement in Afghanistan: May 2001. While no total figure of
IDPs is provided a rough calculation indicate that about 350 000 are displaced due to drought
while around 200 000 are displaced due to war activities. The difference between UNCO and
WFP reports when it comes to numbers could be that WFP includes a larger number of longer
term IDPs.
5 Map made by Authors based on a range of sources, drawing by Robert Sjursen
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The above map indicates the variation between areas when it comes to major
military activities during the last ten years. If we compared this to a map of
origin for recently displaced, we would see that most would come from areas
that have not been the scene of armed conflict for a long time. Interviews with
IDP’s in Herat further confirm that it has been the drought rather than
fighting that has triggered their departure.
However, data on displacement is in itself a problem. The number of
internally displaced is uncertain and the humanitarian agencies have not been
able to provide a consolidated overview. Reporting formats vary, with some
reporting on the number of individuals, while others report on families. This
may have major implications: From Herat, the UN reports on 140,000 IDPs in
camps, while for Kandahar it reports on 23,000 families in smaller groups. If
we assume a standards family size of seven, which is low for the nomad
population, the IDP population in Kandahar comes to 161,000. Still, the bulk
of the assistance goes to Herat, which has received almost all the media
attention since early reports on December of IDP’s dying of cold in the camps.
Whereas it is believed that the majority of the displaced stay inside the
country, it is also clear that many have attempted to cross into neighbouring
countries. It is estimated to that Pakistan has received 170,000 during the past
seven months, who are now residing in camps, with the constant threat of
being shipped back. The majority of those who get to Pakistan escape from
armed conflict rather than drought. Like Pakistan, both Iran and Tajikistan
have closed their border for Afghans, but still many continues to cross, often
assisted by the industrious smuggler networks that exist. Officially, organised
refugee return has been put on a halt, although it appears that expulsion of
those classified as illegal immigrants from Iran continues at the same scale.
Given the current prospects, voluntary repatriation is almost negligible.
From the perspective of many an Afghan farmer, he IEA’s ban on poppy
cultivation adds to the problems. Not only have many farmers lost their major
source of income, but poppy cultivation is very labour intensive and provided
seasonal labour for large numbers of Afghan women and men. In the major
poppy-producing areas, the ban has forced men to seek employment in
neighbouring countries or to join one of the fighting fractions, while women
are left with larger family responsibilities. The costs to the IEA of maintaining
a ban is therefore high, and there is a continuous pressure on the authorities
for lifting the ban. It could be feared that if the international community does
not respond promptly with praise to the IEA for implementing the ban and
support for farmers to generate alternative income, the ban will be reversed.
Over the past months, we see a dramatic change in migration patterns in
Afghanistan, with a shift from war-related towards drought-related
displacement. The change would warrant a parallel shift in assistance
strategies, where the emphasis is not only on short-term survival, but similarly
on long-term self-sufficiency. Practical skills, for example in farming or water
management, could be taught to people while displaced. There is also need to
build up a large scale response that aims at facilitating the reintegration of the
displaced in their areas of origin. The return of water for irrigation will not be
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enough, their economic reintegration will also depend upon the availability of
for example seeds and farm power. One obvious response would be to
dramatically scale up the production of improved seeds in those areas not
affected by the drought. Whereas there has been a slight improvement in the
sense that attention has shifted from relief distribution on IDP camps to other
forms of distribution in the areas of origin, it is still a problem that we have a
one-sided focus on short-term relief. This approach may, in ways all to
familiar, contribute to create new groups of aid-dependants, with little ability
to rebuild their normal lives.
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4 The IEA administrative structure
In our last report we presented a brief review of Taliban’s governance
structure. We argued that two distinct religious features have been added to
the traditional pre-war governance structure: the councils – shuras - that are
established at the district (and provincial) level to act as a check on the
administration; and the reestablishment of the old “middleman” function at
the village level. We also pointed out that while the IEA has taken over the old
administrative structure and attempted to revitalise it, there is very little of the
kind in the areas presently controlled by the Northern Alliance. However, it
needs to be mentioned that there are also differences at to what extent the
administration is presently functioning within IEA controlled areas.
Before entering into details on the present administrative structure, we should
make a short historical recollection of how these structures have functioned in
Afghanistan. We will then move on to discuss the present structure at the
government level, the provincial level, and the district and local level, before
we conclude with a note on the strengths and weaknesses of the IEA’s
administrative apparatus.
4.1. The pre-war administration
In contrast to most other countries in this region a colonial administrative
superstructure was never erected in Afghanistan.6 The country never had an
administration that could effectively execute new policies at the local level.
Tax collection, to take one issue, has never been effectively and systematically
executed. The distance between the educated elite that dominated the
administrative apparatus, and the common rural Afghan was enormous, and
one key to understanding the current policy and practice of the current regime
lies here: Taliban leaders see themselves as representatives of the common
rural population, intent on controlling the educated elite that has dominated
administration and politics, and exploited the population, bearing the major
responsibility for the two decades of armed conflict.
The literature contains few detailed description of Afghanistan’s
administrative system. Much of what exists is in the form of relatively loosely
founded critiques. The system that functioned prior to the war was established
in the 1964 Constitution. Afghanistan was then divided into 24 provinces
(wilayat), each headed by a governor (wali), reporting to the Ministry of
Interior in Kabul. Furthermore, there were representatives of the various
Ministries attached to the provincial administrations, reporting directly to
their respective superiors in Kabul. The province is further divided into
districts (woluswali) with an administrator (woluswal) reporting to the
provincial governor. Larger districts were divided into subdistricts (alaqadari).
The smallest division was at the village or rural subdivision level, while the
                                           
6 See Ghani, A. (1990), Afghanistan XI: Administration, in Encyclopedia Iranica, Ed.
Yarshatar, B’ayj’u, Carpets, p.558
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cities were divided into wards. At this local level, there was a middleman
function, a locally recruited person who stood between villagers and the
administration. In the countryside, this function was called arbab, malik or
mir, in the cities it was called wakil-e-gozar.7
Discussing the Constitutional Period of Afghan history, Louis Dupree
describes the functionality of the ministries in Kabul by the end of the 1960s:
Below the level of the ministers and deputy ministers, the
ministries are a veritable bureaucratic jungle. Although
ministers, deputy ministers, and their immediate advisors
generally have a liberal, action-oriented outlook and do attempt
to get things moving, the system under which their underlings
function prelude the rapid completion of any given approved
project. Few bureaucracies in the world equal - although many
approach - Afghanistan in its built-in slowdown mechanism. 8
Dupree points to a shortage of trained administrators, technocrats and
technicians. Middle-range bureaucrats remain perpetuators, not innovators.
People in the countryside treated the officials with cautious politeness, but
tried at all costs to minimise contact. The arrival of a government official in a
village was usually associated with payment of tax, prescription to the army,
or enrolment for so-called voluntary work. Officials were frequently
transferred to prevent them from developing personal power bases, but this
also had as its consequence that administrators could never build solid
knowledge of particular areas, even less so engage in enduring relationships
with locals. Consequently, as Barfield observes, “(…) an official was more
concerned with keeping good communication with his superiors in Kabul than
in having good relations within his district.” 9
As a consequence of the poor capability of state administration at the local
level, there was a high degree of functioning self-governance, particularly in
the rural areas.  Local councils – we will use the term shura – existed in many
communities. The shura in a village should ideally consist of all free men, and
makes decisions by consensus. Traditionally, it is a reactive body, called upon
to solve a particular problem or deal with a particular conflict. As such, the
shuras have never had the capacity to plan, or to implement policies.
Furthermore, a shura did not necessarily represent a particular geographic
division, it could as well be rooted in a particular solidarity group, whose
members were dispersed over a larger area.
Throughout the war, various mujahedin groups and commanders organised
different kinds of councils. These were also called shuras. In contrast to
traditional shuras, they often had a limited membership, and a more clearly
                                           
7 See Adamec, L. C. (1997), Historical Dictionary of Afghanistan, Second Edition, London,
Scarecrow Press, p.13-15
8 Dupree, L. (1997), Afghanistan.  Second Edition, Karachi, Oxford University Press, p. 654
9 Barfield, T. J. (1984), Weak Links on a Rusty Chain: Structural Weaknesses in
Afghanistan’s Provincial Government Administration, in Revolution & Rebellion in
Afghanistan: Anthropological Perspectives, Eds. Shahrani & Canfield, Berkeley, IIS
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defined mandate – most often a military one. Simultaneously, NGOs, who
were searching for more representative counterparts for their implementation
of aid, started to focus on the shura, and some insisted on the existence of
shuras as a precondition for their engagement. These shuras were often less
broadly representative than the traditional ones, and at times their only
function was to gather in the face of aid agencies, in response to their criteria.
During the reign of the communists (1978-1992), the government
administration was functioning only in the cities and the restricted areas where
the government had full control. The various mujahedin groups established
their military organisations, but some also established some sort of civilian
administration. In some areas, where mujahedin groups gained control over
larger centres, they assimilated the existing government administration that
had been working for the communists.
Following the 1992 fall of the communists, the existing administration shifted
hands to the mujahedin government. This administration was fragmented in
two ways. Firstly, powerful commanders solidified their control over
particular areas, and built up their own administrative apparatus that took
little direction from the capital. Secondly, the different ministries in Kabul
were divided between different factions and parties of the mujahedin, and the
appointed ministers treated their offices as a personal power base, bringing in
their own loyal supported in responsible positions. Funding for each ministry
and department depended on the international connections of the minister and
his party, but also and how dependent the President and the Minister of
Defence were on their support to maintain their positions. At the same time, a
substantial portion of the old staff remained, but the administrative system
was carved up between the groups, without any unifying governance system.
Concluding on the history of the administrative system, we see that
Afghanistan’s administrative system has never been particularly efficient. The
ability to implement policies and run affairs at the local level has always been
wanting. In the words of Thomas Barfield: “National politics and programs
were largely divorced from rural areas.”10 The administrative capacity was
further deteriorating through the periods of communist rule (1978-1992), and
the ensuing period of intra-mujahedin fighting (1992-1996). In the areas
controlled by the Northern Alliance, there is currently an administrative
vacuum. The IEA, on the other hand, has worked consistently on rebuilding a
modified version of the pre-war administrative structure in the areas under its
control.
4.2. The present administrative structure in IEA
controlled areas
The aim of the Taliban has been to gradually re-established the pre-war
administrative system. However, sources within Taliban explain that they
have wished to develop this system further and adapt it to the present
situation in the country – rather than to take as a blueprint the pre-war
                                           
10 Ibid.
C M I
13
Afghan administrative system, or the system of any other state. Among the
most significant modifications are the introduction of shuras at the district and
province levels, and the establishment of a relatively independent “control
ministry” – the Ministry of Vice and Virtue. These bodies, combined with a
reliance on the flow of information in existing religious networks, gives the
Taliban an unprecedented level of control down to the local level. In the
following we will look first at the central level, next the provincial level, and
finally the district and local level, in an attempt to pinpoint the current status
of the IEA administration.
4.3. The central level
At the central level, there has been a significant decline in administrative
capacity. This is partly the result of the brain drain, as much of the educated
elite has fled Kabul. Even more importantly, the top leadership has had
religious credentials and loyalty to the Taliban as their primary qualifications,
but most often lack the administrative and diplomatic skills necessary to
contribute constructively to running a government administration. Although a
number of people with a modern educational background have joined the
Taliban, and some senior bureaucrats have remained, this can not make up for
the inexperience of the new recruits with a Taliban background. The problem
is exacerbated by the rotation system, where senior Taliban are frequently
shifted between posts, or to the frontline, in order to prevent the building of
fiefdoms within the administration.
Nonetheless, there is a governance system and structure in place. The various
ministers meet regularly, and different inter-ministerial committees have been
established. There is an awareness, at least at the upper levels, about their own
tasks as well as responsibilities of other ministries and departments. A UN
report points out that the Finance department still uses a public finance system
that is modelled on the French public accounting system.11 The process of
budget preparation and management of the central government expenditure
continues as before the war. The system, however, commands minimal
resources. Nonetheless, some of the allocations are set aside for humanitarian
purpose. One example is the Afghan Red Crescent Society, which does receive
a share of the tax that is earmarked for the poor. Also the office of the Mayor
of Kabul receives funding from the state budget – constituting about 30 % of
their budget, while the rest is raised through taxation and payment for public
services.
Working with the administrative and political apparatus in Kabul is also made
difficult by the fact that the ultimate power is now based in Kandahar, where
Emir Mullah Omar is seated. There is always the risk that agreements
established with the Kabul administration is not paid respect to by the
Kandahari leadership. This introduces an extra layer in the political decision-
making process, but it also introduces a significant uncertainty. But, if we
                                           
11 Office of the UN Humanitarian Coordinator (2000), Vulnerability and Humanitarian
Impact of UN Security Council Sanctions in Afghanistan. Draft, September 16, 2000.
Islamabad, UNCO
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again revert to Dupree this resembles to a large extent what he describes as a
defensive technique of villagers. “When outsiders approach, the village leaders
disappear behind mud walls, and the first line of defence (second line of
power) come forward to greet the strangers with formalized hospitality (…)”
With the Taliban taking over the capitol, they appear to have brought with
them their rural defence mechanisms “to protect themselves from the outside
world.”
4.4. The Provincial level
At the provincial level, the pre-war tradition of rotating both the governor and
local Ministers have been continued by the Taliban, who often rotate people
after only a few months in the post. New office-bearers usually bring with
them a number of staff from their military entity or tribe, but have to rely on
the locally employed administrative staff for the running of their office. In
Zabul province, the local administrator who had been working for many years
in the office was asked by the Governor to present the humanitarian situation
of the province. Interestingly, his criticism encompassed both the IEA and the
humanitarian agencies, the former for not making sufficient funding available
for drought relief, the latter for biased distribution of aid where the areas out
of the range of “white cars” were missed out. This official revealed that people
of that area continuously came to their offices demanding assistance. So far,
this had led to reduction of exemption of tax payment, including both the tax
on land and the religiously rooted zakat tax.
The Taliban maintains the system of direct representation of Ministries at the
Province level, although it is assumed that in some locations these have
established a higher degree of autonomy than earlier. It is primarily the
responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign affairs to interact with humanitarian
agencies, particularly international ones, although other ministries does also
demand both regular information and involvement in humanitarian projects.
At times this may make it difficult to manoeuvre for aid agencies.
The Governor does also relate to the provincial shura-e ulama (Council of
religious leaders), which is a long existing body that has gained in prominence
under Taliban rule. In Herat, the shura-e ulama meets once a month.
According to a shura representative these meetings deliberate on both religious
and administrative matters, but a major responsibility of this body is to ensure
that policies and administrative decisions are in line with sharia. The shura is
composed of ulema from all districts, hence a range of religious leaders are
drawn into the administrative system, providing guidance in matters that
might need more religious or public support, but also facilitating the general
flow of information on administrative, religious and political issues concerning
the Emirate.
As in Kabul the Ministry of Vice and Virtue assumes an independent position,
being the control body both of the Ministries and of the population at large.
They tend to be very well informed and it is suggested that they draw on a
combined network of informers developed by the previous Kabul governments
and the mujahedin groups. It is also learnt that people fearing Taliban’s
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attention volunteers information about neighbours and colleagues to ease the
pressure on themselves. As important is the ability to draw on the ever-present
religious network, where even local village mullahs that are not necessarily
supporters of the Taliban have to collaborate. Altogether, the implication is
that the Taliban is extremely well informed about what goes on all the way
down to the village level.
4.5. The District and local level
Similar to what is the case with other top IEA administrators, also the
woluswal, the district administrator is recruited from a different area. The
woluswal does not have a large bureaucracy at his disposal, but does to a large
extent depend on traditional structures to execute his duties. Community
representatives, on their hand, come to the woluswal, presenting the concerns
of the population.
A discussion with a woluswal in a district in Wardak province revealed that
individuals, community organisations, religious establishments and
humanitarian organisations frequently came to demand his attention and
support. At the day of our meeting he had initiated a murder investigation in
collaboration with a religious shura. He had also been instructed by the
Governor to follow up on incidents occurring in another part of the province,
where the expected culprit was from his area. He still claimed that such legal
follow-up was a minor part of his duties. More demanding was subscription
for the Taliban army, as well as tax collection, albeit the latter was somewhat
reduced as a result of the drought. This woluswal argued that currently, he
spent most of his time in meetings with village delegations demanding support
due to the drought, and in assisting NGOs in implementing FoodAC projects
with wheat from WFP.12
In the following, we will first discuss the role of shuras at the village level,
then look at the IEA’s initiative to systematically organise shuras at the district
level, and finally we will focus on the role of the traditional middleman, the
arbab.
4.6. The shura
The word shura is taken from the Koran, which recommends Muslims to
consult each other on issues of social, mutual or individual interest – in a
shura. It is also used in reference to an elected or selected body of entrusted by
peoples to deal with social and national issues. In Pashtun tradition the term
jirga has been used to describe similar types of consultations.
                                           
12 FoodAC – Food for Assets Creation, is a concept introduced by WFP, and is a refinement of
FFW – Food for Work. In FoodAC, the bulk of the wheat is distributed to people who
participate in “assets creation”, such as the rebuilding of roads, irrigation channels, or other
common property. A minor share of the food is distributed to vulnerable groups, which
should be identified in a transparent process involving community representatives. The
concept has been welcome both by IEA officials, NGOs and the intended beneficiaries as it
reduces aid dependency and give the local population more influence on project selection.
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In Afghanistan, during the late 1960s and early 1970s the word shura was
used for gatherings at the national level, for example in  "Shura-e-Milli", the
National Assembly in Afghanistan. With the establishment of mujahedin
parties in the early 1980s some of the Arabic terms aggressively appeared in
the literature of these groups. As one NGO employee and former mujahedin
observed “(…) this was a deliberate attempt to identify the resistance with
Islamic ideology against communist jargon promoted by the then Afghan
government.” His point of view is that the word shura got its place in the
vocabulary of the rural population, as well as the refugees in Pakistan, when
the mujahedin groups established shuras at different levels, in an attempt to
introduce a more permanent organisational structure among their fighting
forces.  The term was further applied for larger alliances of mujahedin groups.
The definition of shura that Carter and Connor13 gives is “(…) a group of
individuals which meet only in response to a specific need in order to decide
how to meet the need”. Husum,14 however, presents a negative definition of a
shura, as 1) It is not just a council; 2) The shura assembly does not have
internal political unity; 3) The shura does not have external political unity.
And he sums it up “Thus shura is not a political body, but rather a
manifestation of a wide spectrum of political interaction between free men,
and between free groups of men.” It follows that the traditional shura is not a
proactive body that plans or prepares for the future, that it does not have a
fixed membership not a prearranged meeting schedule. Any “free man” has
the right to attend shura meetings, who does so will in practice vary a great
deal.
Much of the academic literature on shuras is very critical to the idea that they
can be seen as representative bodies of a particular community, or that they
can be an active part in reconstruction and development programs. This
stands in grim contrast to the importance many NGOs and the UN agencies
have placed on the shura. However, a closer scrutiny of how the humanitarian
agencies relate to shuras provides us with two distinct approaches. One
approach is where agencies upon their arrival in a village call for an interview
of villagers to investigate the needs of that particular village. Such a shura is
often a one off event, relating to those men of the village who might be
available for consultation upon their (often unannounced) arrival. This
approach tends to be applied by the relief-oriented agencies.
The other approach is to build long-lasting relationships with the shura,
investing considerable time and resources in enhancing its representativeness
and in building its capacity. This approach is often combined with more
participatory approaches to needs assessment. This approach entails a
fundamental dilemma, since the objective is a fundamental community
mobilisation, whereas the approach is to root this mobilisation in a traditional
institution, the shura, which often also consists of the people most resistant to
change. On the other hand, by using a familiar and existing body as a vehicle
                                           
13 Carter, L. and Connor, K. (1989), A Preliminary Investigation Of Contemporary Afghan
Councils, Peshawar, ACBAR
14 Husum, H. (1990), The Other Side of the Border. Peshawar, NAC
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for change, gaining access is much easier. The real challenge however, is to
convert a reactive and loosely organised traditional village shura into a
proactive body with delegated authorities that takes an overall responsibility
for village development. This conversion takes time, and it presupposes that
the implementing agencies are aware of the contradiction built into the
concept of a “village development shura”.
This also raises a fundamental question about the representativeness of the
shuras. On the one hand it can be taken to mean that all segments of the
population, in terms of economy, political sympathy or solidarity group, are
represented on the shura. On the other hand, it can be taken to mean that the
shura acts for the common good of the whole population, including those that
are most vulnerable. Realising that shura participation requires both time and
competence, the latter view seems most realistic. A particularly delicate issue
in the Afghan context is gender, women are generally not allowed to
participate in shura deliberations. It proves that in practice, both Afghan men
and women tend to see the family as the primary unit, and find difficulty
understanding why there is even a need for female representation. This
underlines a major difference in perception of gender issues, but does not
imply that women’s views have the same influence on shura meetings as those
of men. Some aid agencies have, employing female staff, been able to establish
consultative mechanisms with women, systematically feeding their viewpoints
into shura discussions.
Discussing the role of the village shuras also raises a concern about
coordination. Not rarely do we see that agencies tend to have their own
requirements for the establishment of shuras. This has resulted in several
shuras within the same village, with a membership that is partially
overlapping. Furthermore, as we will return to, village shuras also have
performed duties in relation to the authorities. Taking government recognised
shuras as the starting point for development shuras is often smart, since it
gives the agency involvement a different level of political legitimacy, and
makes it easier for the village shura itself to play an active role in negotiations
with the authorities.
4.7. The IEA and the Shuras
The relation between shuras and the government is essential. Already in 1989
did Robert Canfield raise a concern about the way aid agencies relied on
shuras for implementing assistance, stating that “(…) working mainly with the
shura will be feasible only as long as there is a weak central government”. He
concludes that “(…) as soon as the central government is formed, if it follows
the past pattern of administration, it will seek to impose its politics on local
and regional coalitions, and the reconstruction enterprise will be coordinated
from Kabul”.15 Canfield’s warning was most pertinent at the time, but today
we see that the Taliban has come to see shuras as a vital component of its
administrative structure.
                                           
15 Canfield, R.L. (1989), On Shuras in Afghanistan Society. March 1, 1989
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The Taliban apparently see the shura as a key component instrument in their
national governance system. There are a number of examples where the
woluswal is working closely with community- or agency-established shuras.
Oftentimes, the IEA administration delegates responsibility to such shuras for
administrative matters or for finding solutions to local conflicts. Hence, rather
than banning the formation of shuras, the Taliban has chosen to acknowledge
their existence, and in fact to build shuras at the district and provincial levels
where their role has been marginal. This recognition of the role of shuras can
already be observed to have two contrasting effects. On the one hand, it is
associated with new responsibilities, further influence, and more room to
manoeuvre in local affairs for the shuras – an undoubted asset in terms of
local development. On the other hand, it may be expected that the shuras
should take on certain responsibilities that are in accordance with the interest
of the IEA.
In line with the latter, we have recently seen attempts to regulate the shura
function and to delegate responsibility to shuras for ensuring that the
regulations of IEA are adhered to at the local level. In Herat, the Shura-e
Ulama has recently distributed a “Job description for Shuras of the Islamic
Associations” (see Annex I). These regulations refer to village shuras in the
religious domain, which in principle may or may not be different for a village
representative shura. We have not encountered any village that has two
separate shuras, one religious and one representative, although this division
exists at the district and provincial levels – with somewhat unclear divisions of
responsibility.
A brief review of the Shura-e Ulama guidelines reveal that they are
preoccupied with adherence to Islamic values and faith, payment of taxes and
with ensuring that every citizen is aware of their duty to obey their Emir. The
document does furthermore highlight “the rights of people”, as brought to
them by the Islamic revolution, and “to preach (through religious scholars and
Islamic associations) the rights and responsibilities of women and persuade the
women to comply with the Hijab (Islamic dress code)”. An emphasis is made
of advising people of seeking the right path, where value is attached to
religious education of children, serving military duty and to keep “their roads
and surroundings clean”. The shura is responsible to register, and if possible,
to resolve interpersonal and intercommunal conflicts. It is made clear that
except for religious taxes they are not entitled to collect any kind of taxes in
the villages, this is the duty of the district administration. Moreover, the shura
members are not entitled to any salary or other financial benefit from their
work.  Interestingly, the guidelines suggest a fixed structure for the shura, with
ten members, including a chairman and a secretary, and regular meetings once
a week.
The IEA’s approach to shuras is still in the making. What is clear is that the
regime is intent on accommodating existing shuras at the village level. The IEA
is similarly intent on building shuras at the district and provincial level that
can ensure that policies and decisions are in accordance with the sharia (the
religious shuras), and that can act as a check on the administrations, in
response to complaints from the public (the representative shuras). This is the
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perhaps the most important reform in the IEA’s current campaign to rebuild a
government administration. Albeit this reform has the potential of
contributing to tightened control, it currently seems more significant that this
implies a new level of popular influence on policy-making. As such it does also
represent a resource to aid agencies.
4.8. The middleman function
Information from different districts of Southern, South west and Western
Afghanistan indicates that at the same time that a larger role is granted to
shuras, the IEA have taken active steps to revitalise the function of community
middlemen, know as arbab, malik or mir.
The arbab, traditionally assumed a key role as the contact point between
village and authorities. Carter describes the position as “(…) representatives of
local communities to the government.” 16 They are in theory chosen by the
consensus of the community – presumably in a “shura” – and also by the
consent of the local government authorities. This is similar to the position the
wakil-e-gozar has in the larger cities where they relate to the local
Municipality. This dual role of actually representing both the village and the
authorities becomes increasingly difficult when the conflict between
authorities and communities heightens or the tax burden increases or there is a
demand for the village to contribute with men for the army. Needless to say,
many arbabs were not very popular within their contingency when they chose
to side with the government rather than upholding the views of their villagers.
This traditional position came under pressure during the Soviet occupation
and their importance in the Governance system, inside Afghanistan,
diminished during this period.  Dr. Najimi17 made the following observation
“During the Jehad, as many of the arbabs came under pressure by the
communist government they either migrated or turned against the government
and joined the resistance. Some though being passivists continued to be in
friendly relation with the government as long as there was no direct threat to
his family and belonging.” In the refugee camps in Pakistan, the arbab role
was used as a representative of wards in relation to the camp authorities, and
hence assumed great influence over distribution of relief.
Whereas the arbab would in many cases be a representative of the shura, there
may also be considerable conflicts of interest between the arbab and the shura.
The latter tends to have more distance from the government, and it would also
be the case that as the shura gets stronger, the arbab will loose in terms of
power within the community. There are many examples where the Taliban
have replaced arbabs, as they were dissatisfied with the performance of the
existing representative. In some cases, local religious leaders – mullahs – have
been appointed as arbabs.
                                           
16 Carter, L. and Connor, K. (1989), A Preliminary Investigation Of Contemporary Afghan
Councils, Peshawar, ACBAR
17 Personal communication, 1999
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The revitalisation of the arbab function is another example of the how the
Taliban builds its new administrative structure on the pre-war one. Similar to
the power balance between administration and shura at the district and
province level, the division of labour between arbab and shura at the village
level introduces certain checks and balances, in potentially opens up for
greater transparency and influence on behalf of the common villager.
4.9. Concluding remarks
At an overall level, it is interesting to note that there is considerable
representation of non-Pashtuns all the way to the senior level, including
ministers and senior officials in Kabul. This is a conscious policy of the IEA.
The same is the case of governors and other key officials at province and
district level, although we have not come across any non-Pashtun governor in
the Taliban core areas in Southern and Western parts of Afghanistan.
Despite serious shortcomings in terms of human as well as financial capital,
the IEA has set out to re-establish the pre-war administrative structure of the
Afghan State, and to link it up with their own religious network. Instead of
prohibiting newer institutions such as the shuras, they have rather opted to
include them into their district administration or to regulate them. While we
don’t know the extent of their regulations we should neither underestimate the
possibility the various community bodies as the shuras and the arbab have on
influencing the policies and practice of the IEA. By taking on these structures
they have signalised that they wish to be seen as a functional government,
both towards the international community and their own citizens. And the
Afghans have responded to this, as over the last months we have witnessed a
number of community groups demanding assistance and reduction of taxes.
For aid agencies the fundamental choice is whether to see the official
recognition of community representatives as a resource or as a constraint. The
approach taken be aid agencies in this regard may in itself have an impact on
whether the new bodies become mere control organs or if their representative
potential is realised.
The new power division between Kabul and Kandahar and influence the
religious network and Ministry of Vice and Virtue have gained over other
governmental bodies have brought changes to the state administration. The
emphasis IEA officials make on collaboration with community representatives
and bodies could reflect another important change to the administrative
system.
Until 1996 the entire governance structure of Afghanistan was managed and
run by a small educated urban elite. Now this has been taken over by
religiously educated village clergy, assisted by a small number of bureaucrats
having survived numerous governors and ministers. And this clergy is more at
home when they discuss communal work with an arbab, or take part in a
shura meeting to resolve a dispute than when they are meeting with foreign
delegations in Kabul. This could in part explain their support for re-
establishing traditional administrative structure and accepting the shura
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function, and, furthermore, why things can more easily be agreed upon “at
home” - in Kandahar.
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5 Gender and assistance
Gender has become a core for confrontations between the Taliban and the
international community. Stalemates in the provision of aid has not rarely
been triggered by conflicts over the restrictions that the authorities have placed
on projects that singles out the female part of the population as their primary
target group. While we acknowledge that the gender aspect clearly includes
some of the more complicated dilemmas related to working with assistance in
Afghanistan, we would like to use this section to explore opportunities that
exist for a more constructive approach, maintaining a focus on gender, and
rooting the discussion in traditional Afghan perceptions of gender.
Since so much of the discussion in the Afghan context deals exclusively with
female rights, and the oppression of women, it is worth revisiting the concept
of gender, which is a generic term that refers both to men and women. The
UN thesaurus defines gender as the relationship between women and men
based on socially defined roles assigned to one sex or another. Operational
usage in the international assistance community has, however, emphasised
access to women as target group rather than the methods to access the
relationship between the two genders. A shift to an emphasis on gender may
have less conflict potential, while opening up opportunities for building
constructively on the way gender relations are structured in the Afghan
context.
The particular traditional Afghan values given to segregation between the two
genders, locally known as purdah, is a major point of contestation between
the assistance community and the Taliban authorities and have caused
stalemates in the provision of gender sensitive relief and rehabilitation.
Whereas the Taliban has contributed to politicise gender, it is worth keeping
in mind that gender reforms have been highly contested in Afghanistan
throughout the past century, and that the policies of the Taliban are rather
similar to that pursued by most of the mujahedin groups throughout the
1980s and early 1990s. We suggest there are potential for better management
of  gender sensitive assistance by using existing institutions such as mahram as
openings for co-operation.
In the following, we will first look briefly at how the international assistance
community over the years 1996 -2000 approached the issue of gender
sensitivity. We will then summarise the most salient features of the religious
and cultural model of gender segregation, before we give to examples of
NGOs that have tried to work constructively with the mahram edict. We
conclude by a short review of gender-specific coping strategies.
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5.1. Analysis of gender – sensitive assistance
During 1996 and 1997 the UN were releasing three studies in gender-sensitive
programming in Afghanistan, in response to a number of confrontations with
the newly emerged Taliban.
The first report by United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 1996
emphasised the lack of co-ordination and institutional memory as a major
obstacle to the development of gender sensitive policies and concluded, “The
major obstacles to women’s programming are internal, being within our
agencies and within our power to change.” A further conclusion was that
“(…) the pressure to reach women in Afghanistan has lead to a focus on
quantities reached  (…) and [that] the concentration on separate, specific
women’s programmes has ignored the associated roles of men (…)” 18
The second report by United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs in
May (UNDHA) 1997 recommended a principled-centred approach to guide
UN operations and to co-ordinate a UN approach “strong on principles, yet
open to experimentation with authorities on the basis of these principles, and
supportive of local communities.”19
The third report by the United Nations Interagency Gender Mission to
Afghanistan in November 1997 assert that UN agencies must “stop paying lip
service to their [women’s] importance in rehabilitation and development
assistance” and start prioritising work to implement a pragmatic and field
oriented application of the principles.
As a whole, these reports established a sound foundation for a more
constructive engagement with the Taliban authorities when it comes to gender
sensitive assistance. The practical implementation of the recommendations,
however, was halted after the US missile strikes on alleged terrorist bases in
August 1998. All international expatriate UN staff was withdrawn from
Afghanistan only to start a limited return in March 1999.  Programmes were
run by remote control from Islamabad and UN negotiation for return had on
its agenda two key issues; security to UN staff and equal access to men and
women, boys and girls.
Looking at the situation today, there has been some progress. The UNDP
1996 report writes that “a significant obstacle [to gender sensitive
programming] has been the paucity of international female staff (…) Within
the UN family a mere 14 women are contributing to programming in
Afghanistan compared with over 70 men.”20 Five years later the UN Gender
Advisor published a statistical profile that show the gender distribution of
international staff in the UN system in Afghanistan to bee strengthened.  The
                                           
18 UNDP (1996), Room to Manoeuvre. Report on study of Women’s programming in
Afghanistan. July- September 1996.  UNDP: Kabul and Islamabad.
19 United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNHA) May 1997.
20 p. 107
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UN system employed 102 international professionals, 36 of which are
female.21 UNICEF, to take one example, aims at having two international
female UN Volunteers at each of their regional offices.
Attempting to assess progress in gender sensitive programming, the picture is
mixed. On the one hand, there has been an expansion of programs in the field,
including projects that target women particularly, for example in education.
At the same time, such projects continue to be a bone of contention between
the authorities and the aid community, last exemplified by the conflict over
the WFP bakery project in Kabul. During our recent travels in Afghanistan,
however, we have noticed with great interest that key success criteria for
gender sensitive projects seem to be keeping a low profile. In one case we
found that an agency engaged in mobilisation of women did so without the
awareness of other agencies working in the same district. In the current
situation, where gender sensitive activities are heavily politicised, even modest
publicity about a successful program can be a threat to its continuation.
5.2. Gender segregation and the Mahram institution
Since February 1997 Taliban authorities have issued a series of decrees
relating to female employment, and after the general trend throughout 1999
towards a growing relaxation of strictures, decree number 8, dated 19 July
2000, came as a new set-back when Afghan women were forbidden to work
for international humanitarian agencies, and  “any previous edict in this
regard is null and void”.22 Taliban legitimises their rigid interpretations of
gender segregation – purdah - with reference to religious ideology. The edicts
are sanctioned by Mullah Emir Omar and uphold by the Ministry for Vice and
Virtue (Amr el-Maruf wa el-Munkir).23
There is a particular religious and moral order and values behind the tradition
of purdah, which in general terms may be summarised as keeping separate the
worlds of the two genders, alternatively as maintaining symbolic shelter for
the women.  Purdah, embodies and structures everyday behaviour by men and
women through rules for avoidance behaviour and segregation and by
regulating association between the two sexes to different locations. Spatial
arrangements furthermore usually assign females to the private sphere and
men to the public sphere. Ways of practising female seclusion vary with age,
education, class, wealth, ethnic group and rural or urban background, and
accordingly have different impact on the gender division of labour. Traditional
indigenous values of honour and shame were reinforced during years of war
and exile when the honour of men in the eyes of their peers depended on the
protection and modest conduct of “their” women.
                                           
21 Profile of Employment of Women in Afghanistan Assistance Programme, UN Gender
Advisor,  Islamabad, August 2000
22 Source available at http://www.pcp.org/news/  Female Employment in Afghanistan: A study
of Decree #8, Matthew Fielden and Sippi Azerbaijani- Moghadam
23 This department chastises and disciplines Afghan citizens men and women, through on the
spot punishment for breach of the rules for bodily posture.
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The religious law - Sharia - classifies cross-sex relationships within two
categories.  There is mahram relationships, which are formed either by birth
or marriage and will include consanguineously the immediate family of the
woman, and affinally it includes the spouse, spouses of children and their
children. The number of mahram women can approach will depend on the
number and residence of the relevant category of kinsmen. The opposite is
namahram, men that women should not interact with. Men and women who
are namahram must be segregated, women should be secluded from
namahram men and their movements in public should be chaperoned.
Agency responses to the Taliban have been categorised as principle-centred
versus defeatist, as adaptive versus challenging. These classifications give a
faulty impression that there is one right way, whereas field experience show
that a combination is a must to develop a gender perspective appropriate to
the particular tasks and activities undertaken. The way gender is politicised
still represents a major challenge, and there is also a need to be aware that for
organisations working in the field, there are real consideration to be made, for
example of what it acceptable in terms of exposing staff to risk.
While short and medium term aid policies have little chance of influencing the
overall structure of gender relationship inside Afghanistan, we suggest that
exploration and evaluation of experiences of turning reactive responses into
proactive strategies in programmes be given priority. This is unfortunately a
far cry from existing practice. When two of the authors of this report gave a
presentation to a group of about ten senior expat staff from aid agencies, we
found that the mahram concept was wholly unfamiliar. Given that these were
all agencies involved in gender-sensitive programming, negotiation conditions
for the employment of female staff with the authorities, it is serious that a the
religious and ideological core of the discussion remains unfamiliar to those in
charge.
5.3. Field assistance strategies
Afghanistan is suffering from the worst drought in thirty years. The UN office
for the co-ordination of assistance to Afghanistan assess that by June 2001 at
least half the population will be affected, three to four million severely another
eight to twelve million moderately. Internal displacement is estimated at over
200 000 in the first quarter of 2001 alone.24 An overall effect of the drought is
increased mobility caused by destitution. Decreased purchasing power among
poor households leads to increased rural-urban migration to the cities of male
labour in search of work, which again results in more female-headed
households.25
                                           
24 Source available on http://www.pcpafg.org/ Drought and Displacement in Afghanistan.
25 The empirical generalisations presented below are based upon data from anthropological
fieldwork between March and May 1999 in Herat province, Western Afghanistan,
supplemented with data from visits to the same villages in winter 2000 (A. Strand) and spring
2001 (K. B. Harpviken).
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From the provinces in the North-west and the centre, labour-migration to Iran
is a major coping strategy to ensure the viability of the households. This
coping strategy developed in response to changing micro-macro factors over
more than twenty years, and what was initially a way of dealing with this
short- and medium term difficulties, seem to have developed into a long-term
adaptation to enduring uncertainty. Where the initial push to exile was war,
we today see new push factors such as drought, general economic decline as
well as pull-factors such as work opportunities in Iran, contributing to the
maintenance of an established migration pattern.
Poor households rarely specialise in a single income-earning activity, but
pursue multiple tasks where women perform productive and reproductive
work together with other members of the family and household. Changing
patterns of these livelihoods are related both to micro factors in the household
such as changes in the dependency ratio (numbers of producers relative to
consumers), and factors in the macro-contexts, such as war, drought, or
market fluctuations.
The women interviewed in Herat in the spring of 1999 belonged to
households of agricultural workers, sharecroppers and nomads. Woman’s
input in agriculture is crucial, especially in poor households. When designing
programs, there is a need to be aware that the gender division of labour varies
according to economic adaptation in the households. The capacity and interest
of the wife of a agricultural tenant will be different from that of the wife of a
nomad share-cropper. Henceforth, income-generating activities suggested for
women needs to build on careful investigation of the particular context, in
order to find productive activities that link with the livelihoods pursued by the
larger household that these women form an integrated part of.
In order to build that understanding, and to implement gender-sensitive
programs successfully, there is a need to involve domestic actors, and it is
crucial to interface with local communities in ways that involve both genders.
Here, how one relates to the mahram institution becomes absolutely essential.
Below we give examples of how two organisations choose different
approaches to dealing with the mahram edict in their programs, again based
on fieldwork in Herat in 1999.
1) Woman with accompaniment: An international NGO is engaged in a
community development program, where the engagement of women in
needs assessment, and as project beneficiaries is seen as crucial. This
organisation has, in full understanding with the authorities, employed
women that are always accompanied by a mahram when travelling to
the field. The mahram has no particular responsibilities beyond being a
travel companion. This is probably the most common agency response
to maharram regulations.
2) Husband & wife teams: A national NGO conducts training for
inhabitants in mine-affected villages on how to minimise the risk for
mine accidents while conducting their daily activities. In order to reach
also the women, a number of husband & wife teams were recruited.
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These teams settle in the communities where the training is to be
provided for periods ranging from four to ten weeks, and the female
team member works exclusively with women, conducting classes for
smaller groups of women in private houses. The man conducts training
for men and for children, mainly in mosques, or in the local school. By
employing both the husband and the wife in meaningful jobs that can
be combined, the agency does not only meet the mahram regulations,
they also do so without placing the man in the delicate position of
being solely a travel companion.
Innovative use of mahram restrictions also represents one of the few
possibilities for co-operation between men and women in rural communities.
A further exploration of strengths and weaknesses of different mahram
arrangements would be a much needed contribution to the debate on
pragmatic gender-sensitive programming, but would need to be followed up
with an intense capacity-building exercise for agency staff. Herein lies great
potential for reducing friction with the IEA over gender sensitive
programming.
5.4. Gender and coping
The UN and NGO community has moved towards greater involvement of
indigenous structures and coping strategies. Agencies could improve policy
even further on gender sensitivity by giving greater attention to discussion
with beneficiaries of both genders. In many reports women are treated as
synonymous to a vulnerable group.  We suggest the concept of vulnerabilities
is better understood as a bundle of risks, which better captures the unevenly
distributed risks and vulnerabilities between the two genders. In the following,
we will focus on particular risk for women that are associated with the
intensification of migration in many areas of Afghanistan.
The availability of employment opportunities in Iran is an important safety net
for young men, most of them bachelors. The difference between young single
men who can live and work at building sites and married men who have to
combine day labour with looking after and protecting their family have
specific gender impact. With the tightening of Iranian border controls, and
occasional homesending of “illegal immigrants” to Afghanistan, it has been
increasingly common that men go to Iran alone, leaving their families behind
for periods ranging from six months to one or two years.
Female returnees, on the other hand, spoke at length about how afraid they
had been of being separated from their husbands in the round ups made by
Iranian police on illegal refugees/immigrants. Returning single women risk
suspicion from neighbours and relatives who treat them as immoral women,
and we were told that many of these women sell furniture to finance an illegal
return to Iran.
 It is also worth noting that women are particularly exposed to the adverse
consequences of homelessness.  Broken household structures and dislocation
of family networks places a double burden – economically and morally – on
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them. Traditional coping mechanisms used by women depend on activating
the network of the extended family. Displacement weakens women’s
individual access to these mechanisms, we suggest that gender sensitive
support is prioritised in interventions towards the household.
Interestingly, the return of a young generation of Afghan women with
experience from work and schooling in Iran and Pakistan open possibilities for
stronger engagement with gender relief work and better relationship with
between humanitarian organisations and female community. Here, there are
contrasts between the Iranian and the Pakistan refugee experience. Those who
have been refugees in Iran, have been exposed to a different level of welfare
services, a more advanced infrastructure, and most importantly to different
gender relations. This is emphasised both my male and female respondents,
who point out the Iranian experience has led to a totally different perspective
on the world, in the words of one informant: “It has enlightened me about the
relationship between man and woman.” The refugee experience has changed
attitudes and developed new competence, and hence represents an untapped
resource for the gender sensitive programming.
At the overall level, there is no doubt that gender remains a sensitive and
conflicted issue when dealing with assistance to Afghanistan. The policies
pursued by the IEA represents a very real obstacle. At the same time, we want
to suggest that a more careful analysis of gender relationships is a
precondition for a constructive engagement in this field, and that it will indeed
demonstrate that in much of what at first sight seems as mere obstacles, there
also exists opportunities to deal with the issues in new ways
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6 Conclusions
The UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Afghanistan, Erick de Mul, in a recent
talk on the Afghan situation pointed out that the international community had
also played a role in increasing the hard line adopted by the Taliban. He stated
that the decision to make an exception of US and UK personnel when
returning international staff after eight months absence, undermined UN
credibility. De Mul continued:
This was the first blow to [bring] the Taliban [to the realisation] that the
UN was not a neutral organisation. This was followed by sanctions.
They were followed by smart sanctions, then a non-response to the ban
on poppy [cultivation]. Then the glorious visit of the leader of the
Northern Alliance to Europe. If we had wanted to irritate people and
make engagement more difficult, then this is the recipe that should have
been followed.26
De Mul is no less critical of the policies and practices pursued by the Taliban,
and he underlines that restrictions on programs and harassment of staff has
intensified severely over the past few months. Nonetheless, De Mul’s remark
underlines how the UN role has been increasingly politicised. In the report at
hand, we have underlined a similar point, but with a longer time perspective.
The way the UN and the international community have been dealing with the
Taliban is in itself a major cause for the radicalisation of the movement. While
the damage done can not be eliminated over night, we would like to suggest
that it is now essential that one thinks through means by which informal
channels for dialogue with Taliban officials are significantly strengthened.
This is particularly important now, as more and more formal channels are
closing.
If one takes a strictly humanitarian perspective, there is every reason to be
concerned. De Mul is certainly right that there are severe shortcomings on
both sides, but acknowledging this could be a good starting point for looking
for alternative options. In this report, we have critically examined the
administrative structure of the IEA. Although this structure contains serious
inconsistencies, and has far from settled, it does represent opportunities for
constructive aid cooperation at the local level, and it does open up for a more
transparent administration, in particular through the representative shuras. A
more systematic approach to local shuras can also be seen as a resource in
programming, and in spite of all critical remarks, working with local shuras
remains the most constructive avenue to foster participation and to build civil
society in the current situation.
Gender issues remain one of the most contested in the context of assistance to
Afghanistan, and the restrictions placed on projects addressing women, or
                                           
26 IRIN, ‘UN chief warns of danger signals’, Integrated Regional Information Networks,
UNOCHA, 6 June  2001
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depending on female staff, are problematic. At the same time, opportunities
exist, and there are agencies that run comprehensive programs benefiting
women, but they all keep a low profile. We have argued that staff competence
in itself may be an obstacle to the identification and development of gender
sensitive programs with the existing restrictions. We would hope that both the
UN and NGOs could be investing more in capacity-building in this area,
preferably accompanied by an exercise to summarise lessons learnt from
successful projects in the past.
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Annex I
In the name of Allah, the most merciful and the most beneficent
Job description for Shuras of the Islamic Associations27
1. Each community that is inhabited by a large number of people must
establish an association consisting of ten people who have religious
competence and those who are modest and honest.
2. Members of each locality or area must appoint one Alim (the person
who has religious competence) as the chairman of the association and
one person as the secretary.
3. All decisions are subject to the agreement by the majority of the
members.
4. Meetings of the shuras are held once a week.
Tasks of the Shura of Local Association
1. The task of the Shura and the local association is to preach the
commandments and faith of the Islamic religion to their respected
people of their communities.
2. The task of the Shura and Islamic association is to elucidate the benefit
and advantage of Jehad (holy war) to the people.
3. The Shura and the Islamic association should inform the people about
their support to and apprehension from the Islamic revolution and
respect for the rights of people.
4. The Shura and the Islamic association should explicate the goal of the
Islamic revolution, which is to serve the people, and ask the people that
obeying the Amir is the duty of every individual citizen of the Islamic
state.
5. The Shura and the Islamic association should advice those who do not
act according to Islamic laws and preach the people in mosques and
Madrassas about the danger of these kinds of acts.
6. The shura and Islamic association informs the representative about the
interpersonal and community conflict and tries at their best to resolve
these conflicts.
7. The task of the shura is to see the mosque that has no Imam and
Muazan (the person who calls for prayers) and appoint these personnel
through people and if necessary establish religious Madrassa and teach
the children in the mosques.
8. The shura and Islamic association must persuade the people to send their
children to mosques and Madrassas in order they to receive Islamic
                                           
27 Document distributed to local village shuras in Herat province. Original is computer-
manuscript. Uncertain whether this is a standard at the Herat level or the national level,
although the latter seems most likely.
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education from the respected Alims (the persons who have religious
competence).
9. The shura and Islamic association at their best must explain to young
men (who are eligible for conscription) about their Islamic duty and
preach the benefit of serving in military.
10. According to Sharia the task of the shura is to preach (through Alims
and Islamic associations) the rights and responsibilities of women and
persuade the women to comply with the Hijab (Islamic code of dress).
11. The shura prosecutes the suspicious people and introduces to the
security department, and the Islamic shura report about these people to
general shura.
12. The shura and Islamic associations persuade the people to pay their
Zakat and Sadaqa according to the Sharia in order to strengthen the
financial foundation of the Islamic state.
13. The task of the shura and Islamic associations is to persuade people for
five time prayers in a day, Friday prayer and the Eid prayers.
14. The task of the shura, according to the teaching of Islam, is to guide the
people and seek their cooperation in keeping their roads and
surroundings clean and hygienic.
15. Islamic associations have the responsibility to keep contact with the
shura –e-Ulema and solve their problems.
16. Islamic associations have the responsibility to control and keep an eye
on the political situation of the area in order to prevent mobilization
and recruitment of ignorant people by creepy people for ghastly
actions.
17. The local Islamic associations have the responsibility to register the
cases of conflicts (inter personal or inter group community conflicts) in
their register book through their secretary and advise the conflicting
people and groups and resolve their problems. In the case in which the
associations are unable to solve the problems then they will have to
refer the case to the relevant departments.
18. In order to avoid further confusions or unnecessary troubles it is
advised that all those cases that need registration must be registered
with the relevant courts.
19. This is not the responsibility of the shura and Islamic association to
collect taxes from the villagers or importers, but this is the
responsibility of the relevant departments. They can only collect Zakat
and Sadaqa.
20. When they receive the news about criminal acts, the shura and Islamic
association will have to inform the representative of the government
immediately and if asked they should also help the government
representative in investigation of the case. This cooperation will indeed
help to reduce the chance for the criminals to escape from Islamic
court.
21. Chairman, members and local Islamic association who are not in the
structure have to work on voluntary basis. They are not entitled to any
salary or financial benefits. They serve just to please Allah and they
consider their services for Muslims as their moral and Islamic duty
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